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THE PECULIAR METHOD OF ENFORCING JUDG-
MENTS AGAINST QUASI-CORPORATIONS IN
THE NEW ENGLAND STATES.
The method ordinarily employed in the majority of the States
of this country, for the enforcing of judgments against quasi-cor-
porations, does not prevail in the New England States. Instead of
proceeding by mandamus, it is the practice there, derived from
immemorial usage, to hold the estate of any inhabitant of a county,
town, territorial parish, or school district, liable to be taken on
execution against the corporation.
The liability seems, however, to have been invariably confined
to inhabitants. The person or property of a citizen, who removes
out of one town and becomes domiciled in an6ther, is not subject
to be taken upon an execution in a suit subsequently instituted
against the town from which he removed; although it might have
issued upon a debt which occurred prior to his removal. The
courts have invariably declined to extend the remedy by construc-
tion; but hold its operations limited to those who were members
or inhabitants at the time of the rendition of the judgment, or at
most at the time of the commencement of the action.
Outside of the New England States, in the absence of an
express provision of law to that effect, creditors of a municipal
corporation cannot resort to the individual property of the inhabi-
tants for the purpose of discharging a judgment against the corpo-
ration. Their remedy is by mandamus to compel the corporation
to pay the debt by levying a tax; but the failure of the corporation
to make the levy, or of the inhabitants to pay the tax, does not
render their individual property liable to be taken by the creditor.
There are many decisions to this effect.'
The usage seems originally to have been confined to towns.
Later on, by construction, it was extended to counties, school
districts and territorial parishes. The rule was particularly applic-
1 Meriwether v. Garrett, 1o2 U. S. 472; Homer v. Coffey, 25 Miss. 434;
Miller v. McWilliams, 50 Ala. 427; Weber v. Lee County, 6 Wall. 211; Rees v
Watertown, xg Wall. io7.
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able to all three cases. The counties were but collections, as the
school districts and parishes were subdivisions of towns, created
for certain administrative purposes. Mr. Cooley, referring to this
point in his "Constitutional Limitations," says: 2 ", By the several
statutes which have been passed respefting school districts, it is
manifest that the legislature has supposed that a division of towns,
for the purpose of maintaining schools, will promote the important
object of general education; and this valuable object of legislative
care seems to require, in construing their acts, that a liberal view
should be had to the end to be effected. Following out this view,
the courts of the New England States have held, that when judg-
ments are recovered against towns, parishes and school districts,
any of the property of private owners within the municipal divi-
sion is liable to be taken for their discharge."
The custom is believed, by the best authorities, to have existed
in England, and to have been brought from there by the early
settlers of New England. Actions against the "hundred" were
known as far back as the reign of Edward I. As the "hundred"
had no property except that of individuals, the judgment must
necessarily have been collected from them.
In 1788, it was held in an action upon the case, for an injury
done to the wagon of the plaintiff, in consequence of a county
bridge being out of repair, that indictments against counties were
sanctioned by the common law, though they would be levied on
the men of the county.3 Subsequently, Lord Chancellor Eldon.
said that, "If a fee-farm rent was chargeable on the whole of the
place called Exeter, he who was entitled to the rent might have
demanded the whole, or any part of it, from any one who had a
part of or in that city'; leaving the person who was thus called
upon to pay, to obtain contributions from the other inhabitants as
he best could. "4
We see from the above cases, that the principle was operative
and applied in England, especially in cases where a statute fixed
a liability upon a municipality which had no corporate funds. In
New England the practice "obtained from the earliest times with-
out any statute. "5
The practice, however it originated, has been regarded as
settled law in Massachusetts for over a hundred years. About
2 Third Edition, 1874, p. 242.
3 2 D. & E. 66o.
4 2 Russ, 45 (1826).
5 Hill v,. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877).
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the year 1790, one Gatchill was imprisoned on an execution against
the town of Marblehead, for a debt the town owed. Mr. Dane,
even at that early day, said that the practice was justified by "im-
memorial usage." Such an imprisonment, so soon after the
Revolution, when the principles of liberty had so recently been
vindicated, would never have been permitted had it not then been
a familiar practice. 6
As early as i8o9, a law for the laying out of town roads pro-
vided that the damages might be recovered against the inhabitants
of the town through which the road passed, by a warrant of dis-
tress, which might be levied against the personal estate of any
inhabitant. An action was also given to the inhabitant to recover
the amount so paid.
A little later, in an action of assumpsit for work and labor per-
formed on a new county jail, Chief Justice Parsons, in delivering
the judgment of the court, said: "The defendants move * *
that every inhabitant of the county of Kennebeck is a party. * *
* As in judgments recovered against the inhabitants of a
county, the estate of every inhabitant is liable to be taken by
execution to satisfy such judgments; every inhabitant of a county
may be deemed a party to all actions sued against it." The writ
was accordingly abated.7
In 1833, it was said by the court to be very clear that one of
the inhabitants of a town "could not volunteer, and make the
payment for the town, and so cause the town to become his debtor
without its consent."8  Five years later it was said that I"where
judgment is recovered against a parish, and execution issued, every
parishioner is liable in his person and property to satisfy it. His
individual property may be taken for that purpose. There is,
therefore, much ground to maintain that where a demand is made
on a parishioner by an officer, to satisfy an execution against the
parish, he may pay it and maintain an action in his turn against
the parish. But it is not necessary to put the decision on this
ground. The plantiff's property was under attachment. * * *
The result is, that the plaintiff was under actual coercion, and was
compelled to pay the debt to save his property from execution.
It was in no sense a voluntary pavment." 9
6 Dane's Abr. 5 c. 143, art. 5, § io, it, p. 158.
7 Hawkes et a. v. The Inhabitants of the County of Kennebeck, 7 Mass.
461 (i8xi); The Inhabitants of Brewer v. The Inhabitants of New Gloucester,
14 Mass. 2z6 (i816); The President of the Mechanics Bank v. Cook, 4 Pick. 405,
414 (1826).
8 Andrews v. Callender et al. r3 Pick. 484.
9 Keith v. The Congregational Parish in Easton, 2r Pick. 261.
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In Chase v. President of the Merrimack Bank, it was decided
per Curiaz, that where the plaintiff, before the sale on execution
of certain shares of stock belonging to him, had delivered a certi-
ficate to the parish clerk, setting forth that he no longer consid-
ered himself as a member of the parish, he had, by so doing,
ceased to be a member of the parish, and that the execution did
not run against him or his property, although he was a member of
the parish when judgment was recovered.' 0
In Gaskill v. Dudley, Chief Justice Shaw said: "We think
that if the present plaintiff was liable at all, it was because all the
members of the quasi-corporation were sued by their aggregate
name, all were liable as parties and original debtors, and the judg-
ment creditor had his election, in the first instance, to levy upon
the corporate property, or on the property of one or more of the
members of the corporation, as in the case of towns."'"
In Massachusetts, payment of a judgment against a quasi-cor-
poration has never been compelled by mandamus.
The courts of Connecticut have been called upon, even more
than the courts of Massachusetts, to pass upon the question which
we are considering. We find there a long line of decisions, begin-
ning in x8o8 and running up to 1844, when the question received
such an exhaustive investigation by the court, in the case of
Beardsley v. Smith, as practically to put an end to all further
litigation on the subject.
The court there said: "The same reasons and necessity for the
application of such a principle and practice existed in both Eng-
land and the United States. Such corporations are of a public
and political character; they exercise a portion of the governing
power of the State. Statutes impose upon them important public
duties. In the performance of these they must contract debts and
liabilities, which can only be discharged by a resort to individuals,
either by taxation or execution. Taxation, in most cases, can
only be the voluntary action of the corporation, dependent upon
the contingent will of a majority of the corporators, and upon their
tardy and uncertain action. It affords no security to creditors,
because they have no power over it. Such reasons as these prob-
ably operated with our ancestors in adopting the more efficient
and certain remedy, which has been resorted to in the present
case, and which they had seen, to some extent, in operation in
the country whose laws were their inheritance.
10 19 Pick. 564 (1837).
11 6 Met. 546 (1843).
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"The courts of this State, from a time beyond the memory of
any living lawyer, have sanctioned and carried out this usage, as
one of common law obligation; and it has been applied, not to,
towns only, but also, by legal analogy, to territorial ecclesiastical
societies and school districts. The forms of process against
these communities have always corresponded with this view of the
law. The writs have issued against the inhabitants of towns,
societies and districts, as taries. As early in the history of our
juritprudence as 17o5, a statute was enacted, authorizing commu-
nities, such as towns, societies, etc., to prosecute and defend suits,
and for this purpose to appear, either by themselves, agents or
attorneys. If the inhabitants were not then considered as parties
individually, and liable to the consequences of judgments against
such communities as parties, there would have been a glaring
impropriety in permitting them to appear and defend, by them-
selves; but if partieS, such a right was necessary and indispen-
sable. Of course this privilege has been and may be exer-
cised. "
The old Connecticut statute providing for the collection of
taxes, enacted that the treasurer of the State should direct his
warrant to the collectors of the State tax in the several towns.
If neither this, nor the further proceedings against the collectors
and the selectmen authorized by the statute, should enforce the
collections of the tax, the law directed that then the treasurer
should issue his execution against the inhabitants of such towns.
Such an execution could be levied upon the estate of the inhabi-
tants; and this provision of the law was "not considered as intro-
ducing a new principle, or enforcing a novel remedy, but as being
only in conformity with the well-known usage in other cases.'"
The levy of an execution under this statute produced the case of
Beers v. Botsford. 13
In this case, an execution which had been issued against the
town of Newtown, by the treasurer of the State, had been
levied upon the property of the plaintiff, an inhabitant of that
town, and he had then been compelled to pay the balance of a
State tax due from the town. He sued the town for the
recovery of the money so paid by him and obtained judgment
against it.
Shortly afterward, it was held in another case that, "Had the
defendant below been acquitted and recovered her costs, an exe-
cution therefor would not have issued against the selectmen
12 Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368 (1844).
18 Beers vz. Botsford, 3 Day 159 (8og8).
YALE LAW JO URNVAL
individually or collectively. It must have been issued against the
property of the inhabitants of the town; and such is the in-vari-
able practice. -14
The ecclesiastical society of Bethany had a fund invested for
the sole purpose of supporting the ministry of the gospel in that
society, by an annual appropriation of the interest. In 1821, the
town of Woodbridge laid a tax on the society in respect to this
fund, as money at interest, and collected the amount by distress
of one of its members. Brainard, J., said, in delivering the opin-
ion of the court, that, "this practice, with regard to towns, has
obtained in New England, so far as I have been able to investi-
gate the subject, from an early period-from its first settlement;
a practice brought by our forefathers from England, which had
there obtained in corporations similar to the town incorporated in
New England. And if this be correct as to towns, I see no'reason
why the same principles and practice should not be applicable to
societies. They are communities for different purposes, but
essentially of the same character. In either case the individual
affected has his remedy, the operation of which, if well applied,
will cure the evil. The town or society will be brought to a sense
of duty and make provision for payment and indemnity.'15
The law on the subject was more fully brought out and con-
sidered by the court in the case of McLoud et a. v. Selby. Judge
Bissell there said: "May the property of an individual corpora-
tor be taken to satisfy a judgment against a school district? * * *
So far as we have been able to ascertain, it has been the invariable
practice, in Connecticut, and that from an early period, to levy
executions against towns, upon the property of the inhabitants.
* * * If then, such be the principle with regard to these cor-
porations, it seems to us, that it would be breaking in upon the
analogies of the law, to deny its application to school districts.
They are communities for different purposes, bft essentially of
the same character.'1 6 In Beardsley v. Smith, the court said that
with all the evidence of the law before them, "until this time
uncontradicted and undisputed, what else can we say, than to
declare, that by the law of this State, each inhabitant of a town is
a party to all suits prosecuted against it for a recovery of its
debts; that each is liable to pay them; and that executions for
their collection may be levied upon the private estate of such
14 Fuller v. Hampton, 5 Con. 417 (1824); Jewett v. The Thames Bank, z6
CorM, 511 (1844).
15 Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conn. 223 (1829).
16 McLoud v. Selby, io Conn. 390 (1835).
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inhabitants? That the same remedy may be pursued for the col-
lection of the debts of cities, by reason of the analogies of the law,
we cannot doubt. * * * We know of no other practical rem-
edy but the one to which the plaintiff has resorted; and if this
shall produce an equalized taxation of the inhabitants of the cor-
poration, it will probably have the effect which our ancestors
intended should be produced by it."17r
In Union v. Crawford, Waite, J., said: "A judgment against
a town is a judgment against the inhabitants of the town; and
the execution may be levied upon the private property of any one
of them at the election of the creditor.'1 8  This is the latest
reported case in Connecticut.
Maine, originally a part of Massachusetts, and of course sub-
ject to its laws, was early iii the history of the Republic set off
from it and constituted into an independent State. Its people,
while it was a part of Massachusetts, were familiar with the usage
now under consideration. It was most natural, therefore, that
they should cling to a rule of such long standing and tried merit,
which had existed for so long a time in their parent State.
As early as 182 i, it was held that, a town "having no corporate
fund, each inhabitant would be liable to satisfy the judgment.
The common law does not impose this burden; though a statute
may. In regular corporations, having a corporate fund, this rea-
son does not exist. * * * It is well known that all judgments
against quasi-corporations may be satisfied out of the property of
any individual inhabitant." 19
Statutes upon the subject were early enacted in Maine, thus
preventing any question, in regard to the usage, coming before
the courts. A full discussion of these statutory provisions will be
given later on. We have ascertained that the principle which we
are considering was recognized at a very early date in Massachu-
setts. From there it seems to have spread over the whole of New
England, with the possible exception of Rhode Island. In New
Hampshire and Vermont, the principle, while never adjudicated
prior to the passage of the statutes hereafter referred to, must, in
all probability, have been recognized. Its manifest advantages
were readily appreciated by the inhabitants of those States and,
as a consequence, statutes were passed, early in their history,
giving expression to the rule prevailing in Massachusetts and
Connecticut, which was there based upon "immemorial usage."
17 Beardsley v. Smith, i6 Conn. 368 (i844).
18 Union v. Crawford, i9 Conn. 331 (1848); Bloomfield v. Charter Oak
Bank, 121 U. S. 121 (1887).
19 Adams v. The President of the Wiscasset Bank, i Greenl. 361.
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In the last mentioned States the law on this point, having been
well settled by repeated adjudications, there was no real need for a
statutory provision upon the subject, and none seems to have been
adopted.
The statutory provisions of New Hampshire are as follows:
" § 5. When such copy of an execution against a school district is so left,
the prudential committee shall pay the same, or call a meeting of the voters
of the district, at which meeting they shall vote to raise the necessary sum to
satisfy said execution and the officer's fees thereon; and the clerk of the dis-
trict shall certify the same to the selectmen, who shall forthwith assess a tax
for said sum.
" § 7. If the selectmen to whom such vote of the school district is certi-
fied neglect for thirty days to assess such district tax, and deliver to the col-
lector their warrant for the collection thereof, such execution against the
district may be levied upon the property of said selectmen.
"§ 8. If such execution is not paid within sixty days after an attested
copy is left as aforesaid, it may be levied, if against the town, upon the goods
or estate of the selectmen, and if against the school district, upon the goods or
estate of the prudential committee; and if sufficient goods of said selectmen
or prudential committee are not found, it may be levied upon the property of
any inhabitant of the town or district respectively.
"§ io. Every person upon whose property an execution against any town
or school-district has been levied may, in an action of assumpsit for money
paid, recover of such town or school-district the sum so levied, and damages
and double costs. "2o
The provisions of this statute seem to me to be eminently fair.
It is careful to make the execution run, primarily against the prop-
erty of those officers who are, by law, specially charged with the
levy and collection of the tax. It is only where they do not possess
sufficient property to satisfy the judgment, that the property of
the inhabitants can be taken. The provision, also, as to double
costs appears to be a wise one, inasmuch as it tends to discourage
the town officials from allowing the property of an individual
inhabitant to be seized through their neglect to levy a tax.
Vermont has provided that:
"§ 1559. When judgment is rendered against a county, town, incorpo-
Tated village, or school-district, execution shall issue against the goods or chat-
tels of the inhabitants of such county, town, incorporated village, or school-
district, and may be levied and collected of the same.
" 156o. The officer who receives any such execution shall forthwith
demand the amount thereof of the treasurer of the county, town, or village; or,
if the execution is against a school district, of one of the prudential committee
of such district; and such treasurer or committee shall pay the same, with
charges, if there are sufficient moneys in his hands belonging to such county,
town, village or district.
20 N. H. R. S., 1878, Chap. 239.
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"§ I56I. If at the expiration of twelve days after making such demands,
the execution or any part thereof remains unpaid, the officer shall levy and
collect the same as therein directed; but he shall not levy upon the goods and
chattels of such inhabitants until twelve days after such demand is made.
"§ 1562. Any inhabitant whose goods or chattels are taken on such exe-
cution may at any time before their sale pay to the officer the amount of such
execution and the charges thereon.
"§ 1563. Such inhabitant shall be entitled to recover against the county,
±own, village, or district, the sum so paid or levied on his goods or chattels,
¢with twelve jier cent. interest thereon, in an action of assumpsit for money
paid, laid out, and expended."21
The provision, as to the rate of interest to be allowed on the
sum paid by the inhabitant in satisfaction of the judgment, is
intended, probably, to perform the same purpose as the New
Hampshire provision for double costs.
The Maine statute has existed for half a century or more,
having been passed February 2 7th, 1833. It provides that:
" 30. All executions or warrants of distress against a town shall be
issued against the goods and chattels of the inhabitants thereof, and against
the real estate situated therein, whether owned by such town or not; and the
officer executing them shall satisfy them by distress and sale of the goods and
chattels of the inhabitants as provided by law; and for want thereof, after dili-
gent search, which fact the officer shall certify in his return, he shall levy upon
and sell so much of the real estate in said town by lots, as they are owned,
occupied, or lotted out on the plan thereof, as is necessary to satisfy said pre-
cepts and expenses of sale.
"§ 31. He shall advertise in the State paper, and in one of the news-
papers printed in the county where the lands lie, if any, for three weeks success-
ively, the namnes of such proprietors as are known to him, of the lands which he
proposes to sell, with the amount of the execution or warrant of distress; and,
where the names of the proprietors are not known, he shall publish the number
of the lots or divisions of said land; the last publication shall be three months
before the time appointed for the sale. If necessary to complete the sale, he
may adjourn it from day to day, not exceeding three days. He shall give a
deed to the purchaser of said land in fee, expressing therein the cause of sale.
The proprietor of the land so sold may redeem it within a year after the sale
by paying the sum for which it was sold, the necessary charges and interest
thereon.
" § 32. The owner of any real or personal estate so sold may recover
against the town, in an action of assumpsit, the full value thereof, with interest
at the rate of twelve per cent. yearly, with costs of suit; and may lfrove and
recover the real value thereof, whatever was the price at which it was sold." 
2
An interesting feature of these provisions is that given in the
last paragraph, providing that the owner of property sold on exe-
cution "may prove and recover the real value thereof, whatever
was the price at which it was sold." The Maine statute is unique
21 Revised Laws of Vt, i880.
22 Rev. Stat, Maine, 1883, ch. 84; ch. 3, § 58; ch. 46, § 55; ch. i, § 6, xvii.
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in containing this moit equitable provision for the protection of
the property of the individual inhabitant.
In a case arising under this statute it has been held that chap-
ter LXXXIV. § 3o, requires an execution against a town to run
against the real estate situated therein, and against the personal
property of its inhabitants. If issued only against real and per-
sonal property owned by the inhabitants of the town, the land of
a non-resident proprietor cannot be legally sold thereon. The
court can, however, in its discretion, render such sale valid by
permitting an amendment to the execution.23
When we come to consider the law in Rhode Island, regarding
the enforcement of judgments against quasi-corporations, we find
a radical departure from the rule prevailing in the other New
England States.
The rule of the common law, by which members of parishes
and counties were liable for the corporate debts, where there was
no corporate property, originated in their ecclesiastical policy or
in local causes, and for similar reasons became the law in Massa-
chusetts and Connecticut, but was never adopted in Rhode Island.
In 1666, an act was passed prescribing the mode of collecting
debts against towns. Parishes never existed. The only munici-
pal corporations, existing prior to the enactment of the School
Act, were towns. The mode of collecting debts against them was
early provided for by statute, and the same provision was subse-
quently made for the collection of the debts against school-districts.
In support of the above it is interesting to note that the ques-
tion of the liability of members of quasi-corporations was, in the
language of Brayton, J., "for the first time raised in this State,"
in 1851. The court went on to say, "As it is not likely that
the question can ever arise again, and is not necessary to the
determination of this cause, we give no opinion upon it. "2 This
is the only Rhode Island case in which the question has ever been
raised.
The statutory provisions upon the subject can be briefly
explained. Every person, who has any money due him from a
town, presents to the town council a particular account of his
claim. If the town treasurer does not pay within forty days, an
action may be commenced against him for the recovery of the
same. In case the town does not have sufficient funds on hand to
satisfy the judgment, any justice of the peace of the town must,
on demand, order a town meeting to be held for the purpose of
28 Hayford v. Everett, 68 Me. 5o5.
24 Kenyon v. Clarke. 2 R, I. 67.
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making a tax. In case this is not done, the Supreme Court may
order a tax to be assessed, upon the ratable property of the town,
sufficient for the payment of the judgment.2
It will be observed from an examination of the above provis-
ions that they differ very materially from the provisions in force
in the other New England States. In effect, they more closely
resemble the law existing in the States of the Union outside of
New England.
The constitutionality of the foregoing common law and statu-
tory provisions seems to have been but little questioned until
about the middle of this century. Even since that period but few
cases have come before the courts in which this question was
directly involved.2
The law must not offend against "the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice." So far as I have been
able to determine, the provisions we have been considering most
certainly do not do so. In the words of Judge Amery of the
Supreme Court of Maine, it does not "transfer A.'s property to
B. It only makes A.'s property liable to be taken for a debt, he-
in common with others, owes to B. A. can save his property by
paying the judgment against his town, which judgment binds him
and all the other inhabitants, and is a judgmenthe and each of the-
others ought to pay. Whether he pays, or lets his property be sold,
he can recover full damages of the town, and have the same final
process for the collection of his debt. In the end he only pays
his ratable share of the common debt. The rule is general, and
is uniform in its application, to every town and every inhabitant."
The court further decided that the Maine statute on the subject.
was not in conflict with the fourteenth amendment .of the United
States Constitution.w
The question also arose in Connecticut in the case of Beardsley-
v. Smith. The court there said: "Does this rule authorize the
taking of private property for public use, without compensation;
or does it authorize the seizure of the property of one person for
the benefit of another; and is it for either of these causes, uncon-
stitutional? To sustain this objection as to the validity of the-
resolve, the plaintiff must be able to show the entire system, which
we have been discussing, to be unconstitutional in its operation
upon the inhabitants of towns, societies, and school districts; and
that what has so long been considered as undisputed law, is not
25 Public Stat. R. I., i882, ch. 34, §% x2-i5 inc.; ch. 58, §§ 7-8.
26 Chase v. Bank, 19 Pick. 568 (1837).
27 Eames v. Savage, 77 Me. 212.
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law ;-and that our jurists have been from the beginning, deceived
as to the extent and application of a plain constitutional provision.
We cannot concede this. * * * Nearly every case on this sub-
ject, to which we have referred, in this State, Massachusetts and
Maine, has been decided since the adoption of the Constitutions of
these States, securing the rights of property from public and
-private invasion. * * * The objection is not so much that the
plaintiff's estate has been taken for public use as to the manner in
which this has been done. But * * * the operations of'the
law as it has been received in this State, as we have seen, is not
to take the property of an individual for public use, but to take it
for the satisfaction of a judgment and execution against himself,
to which he is a party and for which he, with the rest of the inhab-
itants of the city, is, in his own person and estate, responsible.
There is no constitutional infirmity, therefore, in the resolve, *
* * nor in the ancient law and usage of this State which gave
rise to it." 2
In two decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the method
of enforcing judgments against quasi-corporations in New England
is expressly noticed as an exception to the general rule and is not
even incidentally condemned.29
In the face of the above authorities we are forced to the con-
clusion that the constitutionality of the method is beyond question.
It shows no inclination to become obsolete with the lapse of
time. It is thoroughly in accordance with the spirit of modern
progress, as it serves to bring about activity in the payment of the
just debts. of municipal corporations; it does not suffer by compari-
son with the oftentimes slow, cumbrous and expensive methods
resorted to by creditors to secure a collection of their claims in
other States; and it tends, indirectly, through keeping the citizen
alive to his duties as such, to do away with much of the financial
corruption, which for lack of a similar rule, often exists elsewhere
on a gigantic scale, in the management of municipal finances.
The doctrine, however, will probably never be extended beyond the
boundaries of the territory on which it was first transplanted.
But there it seems destined to enjoy a perennial life.
It is impossible to rise from a survey of the road over which we
have just traveled, without feeling a profound admiration for the
learning and conservative wisdom of the courts and legislatures,
who have from such meagre materials developed a rule of so much
merit. William Angus Hamilton.
28 Beardsley v. Smith, 16 Conn. 368.
29 Rees v. Watertown, i 9 Wall. 122; Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 519.
